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Famine, Gold and Guns: The Suri of
Southwestern Ethiopia, 1985-91
JON ABBINK
Over the past few years, the Suri have lived through a deep ecological and social crisis
without substantial external aid from either the Ethiopian governmettt or international
aid agencies. They have experienced drought, cattle disease and an increasing level of
violent conflict with their neighbours, leading to the sévère disruption of their
traditional agro-pastoral subsistence System and seulement pattern. Through
migration, the exploitation of gold resources and Investment in automatic weapons,
however, they have managed virtually a füll recovery of their economy and society.
The Suri, who number about 28,000 and are
made up of two sub-groups, the Tirma and
Chai, live in Kafa région in the far
southwest of Ethiopia.1 They practice shift-
ing cultivation, transhumant pastorialism
and hunting and gathering. Their area is
one of the most inaccessible and neglected
in Ethiopia: there are no government
offices, no public services, no roads and no
police or army posts (Figure 1).
Their territory is a semi-arid lowland
plain, covering about 4400 km2, and
between 500 and 1000 mètres above sea
level. Annual average rainfall (less than
1000 mm) is insufficient for intensive,
permanent agriculture and even (as the
drought and famine crises of the early 1980s
testify) for regulär reliable cropping by
shifting cultivation. The soils, although
fertile, are mainly rocky and unsuitable for
plough agriculture. The végétation consists
of bushland thicket, wooded grassland and
some riverine forest along the Kibish River.
The tsetse fly is not widespread and
conditions for cattle-keeping are good.
Game animais, which were once abundant,
have been greatly reduced in numbers by
ferocious local hunting.
THE 1985 FAMINE
Since the early 1970s the Suri have suffered
a number of setbacks to their subsistence
economy. Epidémies of cattle disease,
including anthrax (probably introduced
from Sudan), made large tracts of their
traditional grazing area around Mt Naita
(called Shulugui by the Suri) and along the
Tirma Range a danger zone for herding.
Drought caused sévère erop failure and
cattle losses, especially among the Chai, a
Suri section living east of the Kibish River
(Turton, 1984, p. 187). Since 1968 they had
also been prevented from hunting in the
Omo National Park, which was patrolled by
game guards who were, until recently,
better armed than themselves.2 They say
they were defenceless in a double sense: not
only did they lack food reserves but they
also had too few weapons to raid their
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FIGURE l The Suri area and Us environs
neighbours (principally the Nyangatom to
the south) for cattle.
The crisis reached its zénith with the
drought and famine of 1984—5, which
informants describe as their worst period in
living memory. Traditional coping
mechanisms (intensification of hunting and
gathering, emergency sale of livestock and
raiding) proved inadequate and there were
so many deaths that most corpses were
simply covered with branches and leaves
and left unburied. No doubt disease was an
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important contributory factor to the death
rate, as De Waal found in his study of
Darfur (1989, p. 7), but it is impossible to
make an accurate assessment of this.
Several Suri groups migrated
northwards to the Tulgit area, Southwest of
Jeba town, drawn both by the town itself
and by the prospect of new grazing and
cultivation areas. Around 1000 Tirma (the
Suri who live west of the Kibish) crossed
into Sudan to exchange cattle for grain with
the local inhabitants (Baie and Mûrie) and
to find new cultivation sites on thé southern
fringes of thé Borna Plateau — an identical
move to one they had made earlier this
Century. Under similar pressure, thé Chai
moved closer to thé Maji foothills, into
territory traditionally regarded as belonging
to thé Dizi, who live on thé Maji plateau.
An adciitional reason for this northward
movement of Suri was the military threat
from the Nyangatom (see below).
The authorities in Maji eventually
notified thé Government's Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) which set
up a famine relief programme together with
thé non-governmental organisation, World
Vision International (WVI). Planes landed
at a small airstrip in thé Kibish area
(constructed by missionaries during the
1960s) and sacks of grain were distributed
to thé Suri. No relief camp was set up: thé
Suri collected thé grain and went back to
their homes. There is no doubt that many
lives were saved by this opération and, as
in thé Mursi case described by David and
Pat Turton (1984), no long-term
dependency relationship was created.
When, after some months, thé relief
opération ended, conditions in thé Suri area
were much thé same as bef ore the crisis:
erop yields were poor, stock-wealth was
down to less than three animais per
household head and wild plant and game
resources outside the National Park area
were being seriously depleted. There were
some unsuccessful attempts by the RRC and
WVI to 'rehabilitate' sections of the
population, including the introduction of
sedentary agriculture in the Kibish area and
the transportation, in 1985, of about 500
people outside the Suri area to be 'trained
in farming' (Abbink 1992). The fact that,
between 1985 and 1990 about 85 per cent of
these migrants returned to their home areas
is an indication of the success of Suri efforts
at self-réhabilitation over those years.
INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT, 1984-91
During roughly the same period that famine
struck the Suri, they were involved in a
violent conflict with their southern
^ neighbours, the Nyangatom. From the side
'of the Nyangatom, this conflict can be
attributed to (a) the need for new grazing
areas due to high population growth and
pressure on their traditional land from the
Turkana of Northern Kenya and (b) the
availability of new weapons (mainly AK-47
automatic rifles but also some rocket
launchers and M-16s) as a result of the
Sudan civil war. The Nyangatom obtained
these weapons from Sudanese government
forces (via their friends and allies the
Toposa, of Equatoria Province, Southern
Sudan) or from illegal arms traders.
Recently they were reported to have gone
as far as Malakal in Sudan to get free
weapons and training front government
forces (Serge Tornay, personal communica-
tion).
Their increased fire-power gave the
Nyangatom a décisive edge over their
traditional enemies, the Suri (or
Nyikoroma, as they call them). A period of
'hunting' of Suri by Nyangatom began,
causing not only many deaths but also the
loss of large numbers of cattle and small
stock and of traditional grazing areas
around Naita.3 One might argue that this
conflict was the prime cause of famine
because it undermined the traditional
coping mechanisms of the Suri (including
the sale of cattle, hunting and garnering and
short-term migration). They were forced to
DISASTERS VOLUME 17 NUMBER 3 © Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1993
Famine, Gold and Guns: The Suri of Southwestern Ethiopia, 1985—91 221
concentrate in larger, more easily defended
settlements which resulted in the relative
depletion of bush resources (for firewood,
building, and fencing compounds) and
lower erop yields (because of shorter fallow
periods). In 1986-87 the threat from the
Nyangatom finally forced the Suri to settle,
en masse, in their present area in the Maji
foothills.
Despite the fact that most of them have
now (1991-92) lived hère for five or six
years, they see themselves as living in exile
from their homeland, Shulugui (Mt Naita),
where, they say, their most important
rituals should be held. Although they insist
that they will eventually return, they are
also aware that it may already be too late
for this. In any event, the northward push
of the Suri into the fringes of Dizi (and
probably Me'en) territory will continue,
whether or not any of them settle
permanently in the highlands.
FROM STARVATION TO SURVIVAL, 1988-91
At the time of my first visit to the Suri, in
February 1988, they were still suffering from
the effects of the drought and famine. By
late 1991, however, they had substantially
recovered from the crisis: many more young
children were in évidence, they had large
fields of ripening sorghum and maize, their
cattle numbers were greatly increased
compared to 1985 and there were some
returnee migrants from Sudan among
them. Ânother indication of their regained
strength and self-confidence was that
almost every adult male carried an
automatic rifle, the new symbol of male
power and status. Next to the Nyangatom,
the Suri were now the best armed group in
the area. The secret of this recovery lay in
the increased exploitation of a single-
resource: gold.
Dizi and Anuak have obtained gold by
panning in the upper Akobo (Dima) area
since at least the time of the Italian
occupation of Ethiopia (1935-41). The Suri
say they became familiär with the practice
about twenty years ago but that, until
recently, they have had no incentive to
engage in it to any significant extent. Not
only is the work hard, requiring several
weeks stay in a kind of no-man's land, but
they have no use for gold within their own
society. It was only external demand, from
traders in Jeba and Maji, which -finally
persuaded them to take up gold-panning in
the years of the drought. They soon found
it profitable. It provided them with cash for
buying tools, food, cattie and, later on,
weapons. For 4.5 grams of pure gold (the
result of a few weeks' work) they received,
in 1986-7, about 300 Ethiopian birr. With
this they could buy one big cow or buil, or
two heifers. By 1991 the priée of gold had
risen by about 15 per cent.
After 1986 there arose something of a
Suri 'gold rush' to the Akobo area. The gold
was not only sold to town-traders but also
used to buy Kalashnikovs from the Anuak
(who had obtained them from Sudanese
army depots). The main use made of the
gold was to invest in cattle and guns: the
two items which would enable them to re-
establish their traditional economy and
reinforce their hold over their traditional
territory. But their newly acquired weapons
also enabled them to attack the Dizi, on
whose land they had been encroaching
since 1985. In 1991 they launched at least
four big raids on Dizi settlements, killing
close to 100 people. In 1992, Suri youths
killed several Dizi chiefs and, randomly,
defenceless girls carrying water or fiie-wood
and men returning from their cultivation
sites. Gold, then, enabled the Suri not only
to survive their subsistence crisis but also
to achieve a new position of power in the
Maji area. No government forces, whether
before or after the fall of Mengistu Haile
Mariam in May 1991, were able seriously to
threaten their position.
In these conditions it is highly unlikely
that the Suri will voluntarily make the
transition to sedentary agriculture. David
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and Pat Turton have described such a
pioneer move by a section of the Mursi,
who settled as cultivators in the Mago valley
at the end of the 1980s (1984). At present,
however, this settlement has largely been
abandoned, most of the migrants having
returned to the Omo lowlands.4 The Suri,
like the Mursi, will be very reluctant to lead
the life of settled farmers, especially if they
have the option to strengthen their foothold
in the pastoral economy. It should be
recognized, moreover, that this attitude
makes good economie sense since the
growth potential of their herds enables
them, in good years, to create substantially
more wealth than is possible for the Dizi or
Me'en, In addition, their new weapons
have given them easy access to game meat
from the Omo National Park (since the
game guards fear their fire-power) and to
the gold, the exploitation of which they
have tried to monopolise.
SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
CRISIS
At the height of the famine, as resources
available for sharing declined, solidarity
between agnates, clan members and fellow
villagers broke down and domestic units
became more isolated from each other. A
division also occurred within domestic
groups, as men and women operated more
independently of each other. Related to this
were changes in the organization of labour,
most of which proved to be short-term.
Male household heads became more
mobile, going hunting, visiting the relief
distribution point, selling cattle, begging for
food (e.g. among the Dizi) and panning for
gold.5 There was little opportunity for
clearing and planting, since most of the seed
grain had been eaten. Women and young
children spent much time gathering famine
foods.
The intensity of trade with highland
villagers increased after 1985. The Suri took
goats and cattle, to exchange for grain, and
gold, which was bought by traders in Maji
and Jeba. This increased market exchange
did not, however, have the effect of
integrating the Suri into the regional money
economy. They used it to funnel resources
back into their own society, rather than as
a means to acquire other commodities (apart
from some sait, razor-blades or cloth). Nor
was it used as a means of exchange or
'saving' within their own Community. lts
main use was as a medium for dealing with
outsiders.
A more long-term effect was a change
in thé balance of power between thé
générations, that is between the elders (ham
or kumin) and junior men (tegay and rora).
Although thé three komoru, or ritual leaders,
of the Suri retained their prestigieus
hereditary position, their effective influence
over the everyday affairs of the Community
had declined. Their advice about raiding,
thé location of new fields and settlements
and thé occasional government directive
was listened to but not seen as particularly
binding. Their mediatory services were still
called upon (for example, at public
meetings) but their authority, aîready
limited in the traditional System, was
reduced to nothing in thé years of crisis.
This can be illustrated by one of the
central rituals of the Suri, cérémonial
duelling (sagine). The main contestants in
duelling are young unmarried men of the
tegay âge-grade coming from different
settlements and/or clans. They use wooden
pôles (dongen, sing, dong«) made of kallochi
(Grewia mollis Juss.), between 2.10m and
2.40m long. Several matches and return-
matches are held over a period of a few
months every year. Bouts are short and
have to be supervised by référées (odda).
One might argue, in classical functionalist
terms, that these contests provide a 'safety
valve' for internai tensions between village
communities, allowing young men, eager
to start life as independent household
heads, to show their strength and virility in
a socially acceptable manner. There is
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certainly more to it than this, although it is
true that thé level of violence within Suri
Society itself (assault, theft, murder, etc.) is
relatively low, such behaviour being
reserved for outsiders.
The important point hère is that the
institution of sagine has undergone changes
in the past 5 or 6 years. Firstly, thé
frequency of thé contests has much
increased. They are now held almost every
two to three weeks over a period of three
to four months after thé main sorghum
harvest (September-November) and
sometimes even after that — for example,
at the time of the first heavy rain, in April/
May. Secondly, the control of the elders
(including thé komoru) and of the référées
over the participants has declined.
Nowadays, thé young men prolong
contests as they like; thé members of a
'losing' team may grab their Kalashnikovs
and start shooting (not always in thé air) to
show their frustration. The elders complain
that thé contests have lost much of their
former attraction.
The increase in thé number of contests
may be due to underlying causes, such as
(a) increased pressure on Suri society from
thé Nyangatom, which has made them
nervous and aggressive but unable to vent
this agression against thé Nyangatom
without risking certain death; and (b)
population growth (at least 3.5 per cent per
annum over the past four years6) and
increased pressure on subsistence
resources, which has led to visible
environmental dégradation. Settlements are
situated much doser together than formerly
and people are therefore brought into doser
and more compétitive everyday relations.
This leads to inter-community rivalry which
shows itself in duelling contests. Finally, thé
fact that young men have taken over the
sagine proceedings is a sign of their newly
acquired power-base within Suri society.
Gold-panning has made it possible for them
to assert their indépendance from their
fathers and older relatives at an earlier âge.
CONCLUSION
The Suri have survived their crisis because
of the fortuitous availability of a resource
which could be used to generale investment
in the pastoral economy. It might be
suggested that this is an a typical case, from
whüch général conclusions cannot be drawn
— after all, how many people have gold in
their 'back yard'? On the other hand, there
may be equivalent resources available to
other groups, in similar crisis situations,
which are completely absent for the Suri —
such as wage labour on plantations and in
cities.
In any case, thé Suri continue to be a
highly vulnérable population. Their main
problems are (1) unreliable rainfall; (2)
compétitive relations between demograph-
ically expanding ethnie groups in an area
with finite and limited resources; and (3)
external threats due to large-scale régional
conflicts spilling over from adjacent areas
(Northern Kenya and Southern Sudan).
State power being virtually absent in thé
area, local conflicts are increasingly played
out at thé local level through force of arms.
As traditional mediatory channels
through established ritual mechanisms —
for example, between Suri and Dizi — hâve
lost their importance, so a policy of
consensus between ethnie groups has given
way to one of confrontation. This in turn
has eut off, or at least seriously impaired,
trade and exchange relations, forcing each
group to rely on ils own resources and to
aim at seif-sufriciency. Thèse developments
are not simply thé resuit of a détérioration
in the natural environment, since earlier
conflicts were more or less contained and
brought to at least a temporary, ritually
sealed conclusion. What is décisive about
thé présent situation is the uncontrolled
spread of powerful modem armaments,
creating an unpredictable and insecure
political environment. Since thé problem of
arms prolifération cannot be solved easily,
thé résultant instability will continue, for thé
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forseeable future, to exacerbate the over-
exploitation of a dwindling resource base by
increasing numbers of people.
A général point to émerge from this
article is that disaster-affected populations
should be given a chance to develop their
own responses to subsistence crises, and
that external aid should be geared to such
indigenous responses (Turton 1984). This
does not mean that they should be left to
sort out their problems entirely on their own
but that their view of the situation should
be taken into account at the outset, induding
any inclination they might have to reject
external aid if it involves too many
compromises or concessions. They will
remain in the area after the relief workers
have left and the genera! level of socio-
economic development and the cultural and
political context wil! be largely unchanged.
A sustainable development program must
therefore be based upon concrete
knowledge of these conditions. In the case
of the Suri this would mean, more
specifically:
— recognizing their wish to maintain their
pastoral economy;
— making the provision of veterinary
services an integral part of any aid
programme;
— taking into account their seasonal
transhumant movements;
— recognising the importance of the
gathering of wild vegetable products to
daily subsistence;
— recognising the central rôle of women in
most subsistence activities;
— ensuring that any development of
irrigation agriculture (along the Kibish
river) is focused on crops familiär to the
Suri; and
— in the long run, improving transport,
educational and médical facilities to
enable them to participate in the national
economy.
But one should not expect too much of
such 'development' schemes. Based on
their past expérience of state intervention
in their affairs, the Suri are weary of outside
interférence of any sort and, in addition, are
contemptuous of the peasant culture of the
Dizi and other highlanders. Having now a
power-base which gives them a great deal
of autonomy, it will be difficult — though
not impossible — to discourage them from
attacking outsiders (such as travellers and
teachers), raiding members of neighbouring
groups for livestock and from hunting in the
Omo National Park. If 'development'
means giving up their self-won
independence and proudly maintained
culture, they wil! probably refuse it,
preferring to rely on their own resources in
times of crisis, even if the human costs are
high.
Notes
I am grateful to the Royal Netherlands Academy
of Sciences (K.N.A.W.), Amsterdam, for the
research funding which made my 1990/91
fieldwork among the Suri possible.
1. They are popularly known as Surma (e.g.
Beckwith & Fisher 1990,1991) but, although
this name is known to them, they more often
refer to themselves as Suri when talking to
outsiders. Amongst themselves they use the
self-names 'Chai' and 'Tirma'.
The population estimate is based on a
field census carried out in 1991/2. The local
administration, in Maji, has no census data
on the Suri. During the 1985 famine, World
Vision International (referred to later in the
article) estimated the population at 35,000 —
almost certainly an over-estimate. The 1984
census of Ethiopia (Office of the Population
and Housing Census Commission, 1990, p.
33) treats the Suri and Surma as separate
groups and gives their combined population,
based on a sample, as 16,426.
2. See Turton (1987) for an account of the effects
of the Omo National Park on the Mursi.
3. Some of this information was conftcmed to me
by Serge Tornay, the leading anthropological
authority on the Nyangatom, during a
conversation in Addis Ababa in January 1991.
DISASTERS VOLUME 17 NUMBER 3 © Basü Blackwell Ltd. 1993
Famine, Gold and Guns: The Suri of Southwestern Ethiopia, 1985-91 225
4. This is revealed in the two most recent films
on the Mursi (Woodhead, 1991a, 1991b).
5. After the Kibish food distribution point was
closed, the Suri obtained food from a camp
established by the UNHCR for Sudanese
refugees at Dima on the Akobo (Dima) River.
6. Based on field census data, 1991.
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